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Abstract 
 
This paper explores and supports the use of the principal components analysis to objectively 
establish countries’ relative economic size and determine variables’ weights in a new IMF 
quota formula. This approach shows a rebalancing of quotas shares in favor of developing 
countries over time but suggests that PCA-generated quota formulas can only guide and not 
determine IMF quota structure. The simulation of ad hoc quota increases using PCA-
generated quota formulas indicates that a rebalancing of actual quota shares and voting 
power in favor of developing countries, while preserving low-income countries voting share, 
is achievable if advanced economies forego increases in their quotas and total basic votes are 
at least tripled. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The issue of quota formulation has been on the agenda of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for several years now, demonstrating the difficulty for its members to find a common 
ground thereon. This situation is mainly due to the multiple functions assigned to quotas at 
the creation of the Fund. Indeed, quotas serve four functions. First, a quota is equal to the 
member’s capital subscription to the IMF. Second, it serves also as a reference for the 
determination of the amount of credit that a member may obtain from the Fund in case of 
balance of payments crisis. Third and certainly the most important function, quota determines 
the member’s voting power at the Executive Board of the Fund. Fourth, it is the relative share 
in a general allocation (creation) of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) the member can expect.2 
 
Quotas are currently determined by a set of five formulas.3 Although the quota formulas have 
evolved over time, the quota structures themselves did not keep pace with the changes in the 
world economy, reflecting a complex quota adjustment mechanism and other political 
constraints. As a result, many countries that have experienced a rapid economic development 
find themselves with a quota that does not represent their real economic importance in the 
global economy (for example China).  
 
Consequently, criticisms on the way quotas are determined have been mounting over time, as 
more and more countries are asking for a better representation in the quota structure. A Quota 
Formula Review Group (QFRG) was even appointed in 1999 to review the existing quota 
regime. Unfortunately, the quota formula it has proposed was rejected by a majority of 
countries as they view that the variables retained in the formula mostly favor industrial 
countries. Since then, IMF Executive Board meetings on the issue essentially focused on the 
variables to be included in the formula, with a consensus on the need to limit the size of the 
definitive set to a few variables. However, an agreement on these variables and 
corresponding weights –hence on a new quota formula– is yet to be reached. 
 
Nevertheless, by launching in 2004 the implementation of a medium term strategy with a 
view to redefining its role in a changing and more globalized economic and financial world, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expressed strong resolve to address the issue of 
governance within the institution. The objective in this area is to ensure that every member 
country has a fair voice and quota with a view to enhancing legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the Fund. To this end, a two-stage approach has been developed and the Board of Governors 
approved in September 2006 a resolution (thereafter referred to as the Resolution) that 
endorses this approach. As a result, the (supposedly) most underrepresented members 
benefited from an ad hoc quota increases as part of the first stage of the above-mentioned 
                                                 
2 A detailed presentation of quotas is available at : http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm . 
3 See IMF 2000, for a detailed presentation of the quota formulas and their evolution. 
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approach. The second stage is to address many other issues relevant to the governance of the 
Fund such as increases in basic votes and a new quota formula by the 2007 annual meetings.4  
 
The objective of the paper is to contribute to the debate on quota formulation by proposing a 
new approach, the principal components approach. This approach consists in using the 
principal components analysis (PCA) to determine countries’ relative position in the world 
economy and assign weights to variables in a new quota formula. Along with this approach is 
also proposed a quota adjustment framework for ad hoc quota increases. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the principal 
component approach, which is then applied to six sets of variables in Section III. A 
simulation of ad hoc quota increases is undertaken in Section IV. Section V concludes.  
 
II.   THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS APPROACH 
A.   The Principal Components Approach vs. the Current Approach 
In the approach currently followed in the ongoing quota formulation exercise as shown in 
Figure 1, the Executive Board of the Fund has to determine the variables entering the new 
quota formula and assign a weight to each variable. The resulting quota formula should in 
principle provide a simple and more transparent means of capturing members’ relative 
positions in the world economy, in accordance with the Resolution. 
 
Under the proposed principal components approach, the variables retained by the Board are 
being applied the PCA to (i) establish members’ relative economic importance in the world 
through an indicator of economic size and (ii) allocate unbiased corresponding weights. The 
main differences with the previous approach are that weights are the outcome of the PCA –
hence the Board would be no more involved in their determination but can always change 
them– and that the quota formula is no more considered as an indicator of economic size. 
 
To our best knowledge, the idea of using the PCA in quota formulation issues was put 
forward by Mr. Sengupta, former Executive Director for India, at the time of the Ninth 
General Quota Review in 1988 (see IMF 1988a). His proposal was to broaden the set of 
variables with the inclusion of new “need-based” indicators such as a poverty index, and 
foreign debt and capital account variables, in order to bring about a balance in the quota 
distribution. To this end, he suggested the use of the PCA to include either an additional 
formula –that of the first principal component– to the existing set of formulas or an 
additional variable –the first principal component itself– in a new quota formula.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The full text of the Resolution is available in Appendix I 
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Figure 1. The principal components approach vs. the current approach 
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IMF Staff’s assessment of that proposal was that the use of the principal component analysis 
“…does not yield quota formula equations that are particularly close approximations of 
individual members’ shares either in calculated quotas or in actual present quotas. 
Furthermore, an important element of judgment is needed in deciding on the number of 
principal components to be used in developing such equations and it is difficult to attach 
economic significance to principal components as variables in a new quota formula” (See 
IMF 1988b). 
 
While such an assessment was motivated by the need to avoid significant changes in the 
quota structure, we are of the view that any quota formula should not aim to reflect 
preconceived quota distribution, and contrary to what Fund’s Staff thought at that time, 
weights derived from the PCA may have a sense. We do recognize that political 
considerations cannot be put aside in devising a quota formula and accordingly they are 
discussed throughout the paper. 
 
 
B.   The Construct of the Composite Indicator  
Economic size and quotas 
 
One of the main criticisms to the existing quota regime is its inability to reflect adequately 
members’ relative economic importance in the global economy despite changes since the 
creation of the Bretton Woods institutions. We share that criticism, but for the following 
specific reasons. First, in the present context, the notion of economic size and that of quota 
are distinct. For many, a country’s relative economic size refers to the significance of its 
participation in the world economy, i.e. the share of its output in the world output and in 
some instances its share in the external trade volume. Quotas, on the other hand, as recalled 
in the introduction, serve many purposes at the same time, which are not all related to or 
based on the economic size – even though quotas are sometimes described as a composite 
indicator of relative economic size of members. Indeed, economic size does not matter much 
when it comes to accessing IMF resources as the Fund has developed a range of instruments 
that are essentially based on the type and the magnitude of balance of payments needs a 
country faces rather than on its economic size. The adoption of a policy on exceptional 
access cases further evidences this fact. The second reason, which is the consequence of the 
first reason, is that both notions are not measured on the same basis. Economic size, in the 
sense abovementioned, is one variable, among others, in the quota formulas. 
 
One would have noticed that the international debate on the quota issue is currently carried 
on by those fast-growing countries, notably emerging market countries, arguing that they 
should have a larger say in the decision-making process of the BWIs given their increasing 
importance in the world economy. And the fact that due consideration is given to this issue 
is, in our view, an indication that the voting power function of the quotas weighs more than 
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the other functions and is the main reason motivating that debate. Ultimately therefore, the 
notions of economic size and quotas cannot be de-linked. However, we think that this link 
should be strengthened and a first step in this regard would be to measure both notions on the 
same basis. For quotas to better reflect relative economic size, the latter should be determined 
before quotas are actually calculated. In other words, there should be a measure of what is a 
country’s relative economic importance or size in the world –in a broader sense– before 
attempting to translate it into a quota. 
 
Given that there is no measure of such a concept in the Fund, we propose to construct a 
composite indicator that translates the best this broader notion of economic size. The 
rationale is that if all differences among countries are reflected in the variables chosen to 
describe them, then a composite indicator of these variables should reflect these differences 
as much as possible. This is why we will be using the PCA, which is a method to reduce the 
dimensionality of a data set by finding a much smaller set of weighted linear composites of 
original variables (called principal components) that account for most of the variation among 
the set of original variables –or in other words for most of the diversity among countries. 
 
Dimension reduction 
 
To construct a composite indicator by the PCA, the dimension of the set of variables must be 
meaningfully reducible to 1, which means retaining only one principal component or 
composite variable: the first principal component. The reason is that, in the PCA, the first 
principal is always the weighted linear composite of the original variables with weights 
chosen so that it accounts for the maximum variation in the original data. 
 
Criteria to decide on the number of principal components to retain 
 
There are several criteria to decide how many principal components to retain (they are well 
exposed in Jolliffe (2002)). A criterion widely used by practitioners of the PCA is to retain 
the first principal components which account for a given percentage of the variation in the 
data set. In order to retain only the first principal component, the latter should account for a 
significantly high percentage of the total variation among original variables. Here there is an 
element of judgment about what “significantly high” means in practice. A threshold of 80 
percent is usually chosen, but lower thresholds have also been used depending on the 
circumstances.  
 
Criteria to decide on the variables to retain 
 
The most important element of the PCA is the choice of the data set or variables. The 
variables to be chosen have to satisfy certain conditions, which are: (i) the variables should 
be measurable in all countries (if possible) and their measurement should meet the minimum 
of international standards; and (ii) given the purpose of the exercise, that is the construct of a 
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composite indicator, the variables should relate to the same concept or notion, which is in the 
present paper that of economic size or importance. In this paper, all data are supposedly 
produced according to the international standards, and that the variables under consideration 
to enter a new quota formula all relate to the same concept. 
 
The Indicator of economic size 
 
Countries’ scores on the first principal component will constitute the indicator of economic 
size (IES). The ranking of countries according to our indicator will determine countries’ 
relative position in the global economy. Hence, the country with the highest score will be 
considered as having the most important weight in the global economy; the country with the 
second highest value as being the second most important country economically and so forth. 
 
 
C.   Quota Formula 
Weights of the variables in the quota formula 
 
In previous work on quota formulas at the Fund, the choice of weights lacked objectivity as 
proposed alternative formulas aimed at achieving specific objectives such as a predetermined 
country ranking (see Mirakhor, 2006) or replication of prevailing quota distributions (see 
IMF, 2000). In addition, weights assigned to variables in proposed Fund quota formulas 
outside the IMF were generally the result of authors’ judgment and not that of a statistical 
method. 
 
We argue that a significant part of judgment is avoided when the PCA is used to generate the 
weights of the variables entering a new formula. Indeed, weights are determined by the 
analysis itself, given the data set provided, irrespective of any other consideration. No 
reference is made to existing quota formulas or prevailing quota distributions in that process. 
Hence, the PCA brings some objectivity about the relative weights of the variables, which 
could serve as starting point to advance discussions on a definitive set of weights. 
 
Quota formula 
 
As indicated earlier, the first principal component is always the weighted linear composite of 
the original variables with weights chosen so that the composite accounts for the maximum 
variation in the original data. Using the weights of this component, a quota formula is 
derived as follows: 
Quota formula: α1*x1 + α2*x2 +…+ αp*xp  (1) 
where  αi= wi / (w1 + w2 +…+ wp) with w1, w2,.., wp the weights determined by the PCA and 
x = (x1, x2,…, xp) is the set of the original variables expressed in terms of countries’ shares in 
global totals. 
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With variables expressed in terms of countries’ shares in global totals (as in the QFRG) and 
the sum of the weights equal to one, the output of the formula is not the amount of quotas but 
the quota shares, which sum to one. The quota formula is therefore linear in shares. In 
addition, it keeps invariant the ranking of the IES. 
 
Properties of the quota formula 
 
As expressed in equation (1), the quota formula has all the characteristics the Executive 
Board of the Fund requested regarding the specification of a new quota formula, that is (see 
IMF 2001): 
• simple and transparent as it is parsimonious in the number of variables; and 
• homogeneous in the sense that a uniform change in all variables leaves calculated 
quotas shares unchanged. 
 
Assessment criteria for the quota formula 
 
The acceptance of a quota formula faces two types of constraints: political and technical. 
Some political constraints are explicitly expressed in the Resolution. As regards the weights 
of the variables, the Resolution provides that in devising a new quota formula “consideration 
should be given to placing higher weight on members’ gross domestic product, together with 
ensuring that other variables, in particular the openness of member countries, also play an 
important role.” Therefore any quota formula should respond positively to this provision i.e. 
ensure that the GDP variable has the highest weight in the new quota formula. Moreover, 
there exist other constraints, tough not explicitly formalized in an official Fund document but 
repeatedly mentioned that need to be taken into account when developing a new formula. 
Among these constraints are: 
• the quota share of the major shareholder should not be lower than 15%;  
• emerging market economies (EMEs) quota shares should increase; and 
• a new quota formula should lead to a rebalancing of quota shares from advanced 
countries to developing and transition countries;  
 
The technical constraints relate more to the consequences of a new formula on the size of the 
Fund. Indeed, as it is generally agreed (since the conclusion of the 12th General Review of 
Quotas) that the size of the Fund is adequate, a new quota formula should not require a 
significant increase in the total of quotas for the resulting quota distribution to be approved 
by the membership as the definitive applicable distribution. Hence, one constraint will be the 
minimum rate of increase in total quotas, defined as the maximum of all rates that would at 
least maintain individual countries’ level of quotas –assuming that no country would accept a 
decline in its level of quotas. A moderate rate will be considered acceptable.  
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Moreover, the acceptance of a new quota formula by the membership could prove difficult if 
it entails significant changes in the quota structure and in rankings. The average change in 
ranking, measured as the root square of the squared differences between the IES ranking and 
that of the actual quota structure, is proposed to assess the degree of change in the ranking. 
 
 
III.   APPLICATION 
A.   Variables 
As noted earlier, there have been many discussions on the variables to be included in a new 
quota formula. Some Directors would like four variables to be considered while others 
Directors think that fewer variables be included. In particular, while all Directors agreed that 
GDP must be included in the new quota formula, there was less an agreement regarding 
whether it should be converted in market exchange rate or in purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Likewise, the variability measure as it is proposed has been criticized and alternative 
measures of the variability have been proposed (see for example dos Reis, 2005). The 
proposed openness variable has been seen by some Directors as a duplicate of the GDP, and 
adjustments were suggested to include financial openness to better reflect integration in the 
global economy. Its inclusion in the formula has even been questioned as it favors mostly 
countries with high values in these variables. There has been a debate on whether keeping 
Reserves in the formula, as some Directors are of the view this variable is no more an 
indication of a country’s ability to contribute to the resources of the Fund.  
 
To illustrate the principal components approach, different sets of data with the four variables 
abovementioned but measured differently will be explored. In particular, two new measures 
of GDP and variability never proposed before are introduced:  
• a hybrid GDP measure (HGDP) which is defined for each country as the 
highest of the GDP measured at market exchange rate and the GDP converted 
in PPP (PPPGDP). 
• a hybrid variability variable (HVAR) defined as the highest of the variability 
of currents receipts (VREC) and that of the variability of current receipts and 
net capital inflows (VAR) 
Since some countries expressed a preference to the PPPGDP over the traditional GDP, and 
other favour the traditional GDP, it seems logical that the hybrid GDP as proposed leaves 
each country the opportunity to choose the GDP measure that could increase their quota 
shares. The hybrid variability is justified on the grounds that for some countries, mainly 
commodity-exporting countries, the potential need for Fund resources that variable is deemed 
to reflect is more likely from current account shocks than from capital account shocks. Hence 
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letting the countries choosing the type of measure that reflects the most their potential need 
for Fund resources seems a best option. 
 
The data sets that will be used are: 
• Data Set I (DS I) : GDP, Reserves (RES), Openness (OPEN) and VAR 
• Data Set II (DS II) : GDP, RES, OPEN and VREC 
• Data Set III (DS III) : GDP, RES, OPEN and HVAR 
• Data Set IV (DS IV) : HGDP, RES, OPEN and VAR 
• Data Set V (DS V) : HGDP, RES, OPEN and VREC 
• Data Set VI (DS VI) : HGDP, RES, OPEN and HVAR 
 
Data are provided by the Fund. These data are those available at end-2004 and concern the 
whole membership of the Fund (184 countries) as of end-2004 (Statistical Appendix I). All 
IMF statistical methodologies and terminologies are implicitly adopted in this paper. A 
distribution of all variables with respect to regional country groupings is presented in Table 1 
below. Countries’ classifications are detailed in Appendix V. 
 
B.   The Indicator of Economic Size  
Interpretation of the output of the PCAs 
 
Table 2 shows that the proportion of total variance accounted for by the first principal 
component for each of the data sets is high, between 75 and 77 percent5. This means that the 
first principal component objectively explains 75 to 77 percent of the differences among 
countries and that 23 to 25 percent of the information contained in the original variables is 
lost by aggregating them in one composite variable. Nevertheless, the first component clearly 
indicates an overall size dimension among the countries; which in our case, given the nature 
of our variables, could be interpreted as the country’s relative economic size or importance in 
the global economy.6 Therefore, this principal component will serve as the indicator of 
economic size and the proportion of total variance it explains indicates a high level of 
objectivity of the indicator. 
 
                                                 
5 PCAs have been performed with the SPAD software. More information on this software is available at 
www.spadsoft.com. PCAs can also be performed in other softwares such as Eviews, SPSS, Givewin. 
6 The second component in such circumstances highlights contrasts between the countries. As Reserves is 
highly correlated with that component in all six cases, it therefore displays contrast between the most important 
countries, with respect to the level of reserves. See Appendix II for a more detailed analysis. 
12
 
   Ta
bl
e 
1.
 D
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
of
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 in
 w
or
ld
 to
ta
ls
 b
y 
co
un
try
 g
ro
up
in
gs
 
Q
uo
ta
 
sh
ar
es
 
be
fo
re
 
Si
ng
ap
or
e
Q
uo
ta
 
sh
ar
es
 
af
te
r 
Si
ng
ap
or
e
C
al
cu
la
te
d 
qu
ot
as
 
(F
5)
H
yb
rid
 
G
D
P
R
es
er
ve
s
C
ur
re
nt
 
pa
ym
en
ts
C
ur
re
nt
 
re
ce
ip
ts
C
ur
re
nt
 
pa
ym
en
ts
 
pl
us
 
cu
rr
en
t 
re
ce
ip
ts
V
ar
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 
re
ce
ip
ts
 
an
d 
ne
t 
ca
pi
ta
l 
in
flo
w
s
Va
ria
bi
liy
 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 
re
ce
ip
ts
H
yb
rid
 
V
ar
ia
bi
lit
y
20
04
20
02
-0
4
20
04
20
02
-0
4
20
02
-2
00
4
20
04
20
00
-0
4
20
00
-0
4
20
00
-0
4
19
92
-2
00
4
19
92
-2
00
4
19
92
-2
00
4
Ad
va
nc
ed
 e
co
no
m
ie
s
61
.5
9
60
.5
1
67
.0
8
76
.2
7
76
.9
0
50
.4
9
51
.5
3
52
.4
8
43
.3
5
70
.8
9
69
.1
3
70
.0
1
61
.3
4
58
.1
4
59
.9
4
   
M
aj
or
 A
dv
an
ce
d 
(G
7)
46
.0
3
45
.2
2
47
.3
2
63
.6
4
64
.8
8
42
.3
6
43
.2
2
43
.8
5
34
.3
6
50
.3
2
47
.6
6
49
.0
0
43
.1
2
36
.8
6
40
.5
3
   
   
U
S
A
17
.3
8
17
.0
8
16
.8
0
28
.7
2
30
.3
5
20
.4
7
20
.6
9
20
.2
6
2.
71
18
.1
4
13
.4
2
15
.8
0
20
.3
7
11
.8
3
17
.3
7
   
O
th
er
 a
dv
an
ce
d
15
.5
6
15
.2
9
19
.7
6
12
.6
3
12
.0
2
8.
13
8.
31
8.
64
8.
99
20
.5
7
21
.4
7
21
.0
2
18
.2
2
21
.2
7
19
.4
0
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
30
.8
7
32
.0
8
27
.6
1
20
.0
0
19
.7
2
43
.2
9
42
.3
8
41
.5
5
48
.8
0
24
.0
1
25
.5
8
24
.7
9
31
.9
8
34
.9
3
33
.4
6
   
Af
ric
a
5.
49
5.
40
2.
43
1.
68
1.
56
3.
37
3.
37
3.
29
3.
27
1.
96
2.
10
2.
03
4.
11
4.
42
4.
39
   
As
ia
10
.2
9
11
.5
0
15
.2
7
10
.3
8
10
.2
8
28
.6
3
27
.7
4
27
.1
7
33
.1
9
13
.3
7
14
.3
1
13
.8
4
13
.5
2
15
.1
4
13
.2
5
   
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
7.
63
7.
60
4.
73
3.
03
2.
90
3.
77
3.
71
3.
70
5.
84
3.
53
4.
12
3.
82
6.
30
9.
15
8.
52
   
W
es
te
rn
 H
em
is
ph
er
e
7.
46
7.
59
5.
18
4.
91
4.
98
7.
52
7.
55
7.
39
6.
50
5.
15
5.
06
5.
11
8.
06
6.
22
7.
30
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
ec
on
om
ie
s
7.
54
7.
41
5.
31
3.
72
3.
38
6.
21
6.
09
5.
97
7.
86
5.
11
5.
29
5.
20
6.
68
6.
93
6.
60
So
ur
ce
: I
M
F
G
D
P
PP
PG
D
P
 
 Ta
bl
e 
2.
 P
rin
ci
pa
l C
om
po
ne
nt
 A
na
ly
si
s 
- O
ut
pu
t 
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
Pr
in
ci
pa
l
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
Pr
in
ci
pa
l
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
P
rin
ci
pa
l
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
P
rin
ci
pa
l
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
P
rin
ci
pa
l
1s
t P
rin
ci
pa
l
2n
d 
P
rin
ci
pa
l
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
C
om
po
ne
nt
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
s 
(V
ar
ia
nc
e)
13
.0
1
3.
59
12
.3
9
3.
45
12
.4
5
3.
53
10
.9
8
3.
08
10
.6
1
2.
86
10
.5
3
2.
95
P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f v
ar
ia
nc
e 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
0.
76
0.
21
0.
76
0.
21
0.
76
0.
22
0.
75
0.
21
0.
76
0.
20
0.
75
0.
21
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n
0.
76
0.
98
0.
76
0.
97
0.
76
0.
98
0.
75
0.
96
0.
76
0.
96
0.
75
0.
96
Va
ria
bl
es
 h
ig
hl
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 
G
D
P
R
ES
G
D
P
R
E
S
G
D
P
R
E
S
H
G
D
P
R
E
S
H
G
D
P
R
E
S
H
G
D
P
R
E
S
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pa
l c
om
po
ne
nt
O
P
E
N
O
P
EN
O
P
EN
O
PE
N
O
PE
N
O
P
E
N
VA
R
VR
E
C
H
V
A
R
V
A
R
V
R
E
C
H
V
A
R
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r's
 c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
D
at
a 
S
et
 IV
D
at
a 
S
et
 V
D
at
a 
Se
t V
I
D
at
a 
S
et
 I
D
at
a 
Se
t I
I
D
at
a 
S
et
 II
I
 
13
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2
. S
w
ar
m
 o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s 
in
 th
e 
pl
an
e 
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
fir
st
 tw
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
l c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
 
 
 So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r 
14 
 
Figure 2 shows the swarm of countries in a plane formed by the first two principal 
components using the Data Set I. The two components account for 98 percent of the 
differences among countries. The swarm indicates countries’ relative positions and those of 
the top 10 countries are indicated. Scores of the indicator are obtained by an orthogonal 
projection on the first principal component (which is the dotted horizontal line in the figure). 
 
Ranking 
 
The scores of the composite indicator are used to establish a ranking of the countries 
(Statistical Appendix II). Table 3 shows that the six rankings are broadly similar for the top 
20 important countries.7 A striking finding is that the top 6 countries are the same in all data 
sets, with a slight but significant change compared to the actual ranking. While the two most 
important countries remain the same (US and Japan), China stands firm at the third rank in 
all data sets, confirming its strong dynamism in the international scene. In all sets, France 
exits the top 5 to stand at the 6th place, behind United Kingdom (5th) and Germany (4th). 
Another finding is that the top 9 rankings are the same for data sets including GDP. 
 
Sixteen countries remain in the top 20 in the six variants of our indicator. One country 
(Singapore) which has experienced a strong economic growth over the past decades is 
entering the top 20 in the six sets. Ireland enters the top 20 in four sets. Korea ranks at least 
8th in any set from the 19th place in the actual ranking. Mexico experienced the second greater 
jump within the top 20 with at least 4 places gained and China is the third country to get the 
highest jump with a gain of 3 places. 
 
The impact of the hybrid GDP is obvious with respect to the developing countries in the top 
20. With the exception of Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, all developing countries have a better 
ranking in the top 20. In particular, India and Brazil gains at least 5 and 3 places respectively, 
in data sets with HGDP. 
 
There is also a similarity of results when it comes to the most important gains in economic 
importance. The top 20 jumps show that actually four countries, namely Botswana, 
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia and Turkmenistan, are among the five countries with the highest 
gains in all sets. In general, the reasons behind these top 20 gains are diverse ranging from 
sound macroeconomic policy implementation to discovery and exploitation of natural 
resources. 
 
On the other hand, many factors including conflicts over the past decades may explain the 
most important declines in ranking. One could notice that most of the countries dropping in 
the ranking are from Africa. 
                                                 
7 If we consider that actual quotas reflect the position in the global economy. 
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Overall, the six rankings give a very good picture of countries relative importance in the 
world economy, especially in the top twenty spots. In addition, those rankings are quite 
similar, which allows us to conclude that the use of the PCA to establish countries’ relative 
economic weights is worth doing and hence, the IES, in its various specifications, is 
objective. 
 
 
C.   Quota Formulas  
Weights of the variables 
 
A look at variables weights in Table 5 shows that the GDP variable is assigned a higher 
weight by the PCA in all sets, which is due to the fact that this variable in all sets has the 
highest variance. 8 However, this weight varies only between 0.29 when the hybrid form of 
the GDP is used and 0.35 when GDP is expressed at market exchange rate. 
 
Whatever the set, the weight of the openness variable is non negligible and is interestingly 
fixed at around 0.22-0.23. Similarly, the 3 Variability measures have the same weights in the 
two formulas they each enter in. For example, the current receipts and net capital inflows 
have a constant weight of 0.21 with either form of GDP. Consequently, Reserves appears as 
being given the residual weight, which varies from 0.20-0.23 when GDP at market exchange 
rate is used to 0.26-0.27 with HGDP. Overall, GDP has the highest weight in all formulas. 
Openness has an important weight too, though this weight does not differ significantly from 
those of Variability and Reserves. 
 
Quota distributions 
 
The diverse sets of weights are used to calculate individual quota shares. Countries’ quota 
shares vary across formulas. Nevertheless, regarding the top 20 countries, the USA has lower 
than actual quota shares in data sets with HGDP and those shares are lower than 15 percent. 
Among G7 countries, Japan is the only country always experiencing an increase in its quota 
share while those of France, UK and Italy always decline (see Statistical Appendix III). In 
the three data sets including GDP, Japan ends up with a doubling of its actual quota share. At 
least four out of the five countries that are recording the highest increases in their quota 
shares are from Asia, confirming assertions that this region is a rising economic power.  
 
                                                 
8 From an economic standpoint, GDP should probably have the highest weight, independently of whether the 
cross-country variability of GDP is higher or lower than that of the other variables in the data sets. However, the 
PCA would give the largest weight to the variable with the greatest cross-country variation –irrespective of 
other considerations–, which happens to be GDP in all our data sets. 
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No African country appears in the top quota increases but many of them are experiencing the 
most significant declines in quota shares. Another interesting finding is that many of those 
countries that see their quotas share shrinking are oil-producing countries. While the 
appearance of Kuwait or even Iraq could be understandable given the turbulences in that 
region, this finding may seem counterintuitive as one would expect them among the most 
dynamic countries given their significant natural resources. 
 
Country groupings and Executive Board constituencies 
 
The new quota structure in terms of country groups and Executive Board constituencies are 
shown in Table 5. The quota structures show an increase in the share of advanced economies 
when GDP at market exchange rate is used. Conversely, when the Hybrid GDP is included in 
the formula, advanced countries are losing quota shares in favor of developing countries –and 
hence, there is quota rebalancing. In all quota formulas, the transition countries as a group 
have a lower quota shares but this decrease is lower with HGDP.  
 
The increase in the share of advanced economies is essentially owing to those of Japan, 
Ireland and Spain. In the developing and transition countries groups, many African, Middle 
East and Transition countries would lose a significant size of their quota shares. Conversely, 
Asian developing countries would benefit from the sharp increase in China’s share and those 
of Korea and Singapore. When the Hybrid GDP is included in the formula, the group of 
developing Asian countries at the IMF tops the United States. 
 
Implications for the size of the Fund 
 
Should any PCA-derived quota structure be retained as such, this would imply a significant 
increase in total quotas. As shown in Table 5, the size of the quotas would have to be at least 
27 times higher than what it is presently. It would be the case because many countries with 
already a small quotas shares would have them further reduced, thus adding to the increase of 
the Fund size to maintain their number of quotas. This increase in the size is unfortunately 
not a desired outcome as the Executive Board agreed that the actual size of the Fund is 
broadly adequate. 
 
 
D.   Alternative Quota Formulas 
The facts that a quota rebalancing is only achieved when HGDP is included in the formula 
and that all quota distributions require a significant increase in total quotas to be applicable 
may rightly question the appropriateness of the PCA-generated sets of weights for the 
purpose of weight determination. Consequently, it could be useful to explore alternative sets 
of weights to see whether it is possible to improve these findings.  
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Table 5. Quota formulas : Weights, Quotas shares by country groupings and Executive Board constituencies, 
and Assessment criteria 
Quotas 
before 
Singapore
Quotas after 
Singapore
Calculated 
quotas DS I DS II DS III DS IV DS V DS VI
Weights of variables
Hybrid GDP, 2002-2004 0.29 0.30 0.30
GDP, 2002-2004 0.35 0.36 0.35
Reserves 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.27
Openness 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Variability of receipts and net K 0.23 0.23
Variability of receipts 0.18 0.18
Hybrid variability 0.21 0.21
Quota shares, in percent
Advanced economies 61.591 60.512 67.080 64.969 64.118 64.630 56.052 54.780 55.493
   Major Advanced (G7) 46.027 45.222 47.323 50.170 49.081 49.697 42.372 40.938 41.732
      USA 17.382 17.077 16.795 19.273 17.251 18.490 14.792 12.570 13.903
   Other advanced 15.563 15.291 19.757 14.800 15.037 14.933 13.681 13.842 13.762
Developing countries 30.869 32.080 27.610 29.578 30.403 29.951 37.497 38.694 38.065
   Africa 5.493 5.397 2.427 2.603 2.584 2.628 3.197 3.209 3.233
   Asia 10.292 11.497 15.274 16.445 17.298 16.573 22.603 23.724 22.890
   Middle East 7.628 7.599 4.725 4.492 4.933 4.925 4.882 5.358 5.321
   Western Hemisphere 7.456 7.586 5.184 6.038 5.588 5.825 6.816 6.403 6.621
Transition economies 7.540 7.408 5.313 5.453 5.479 5.420 6.451 6.526 6.441
Emerging markets 20.290 21.685 22.157 25.221 25.498 25.047 32.617 33.218 32.633
IMF Low-income countries 7.705 7.570 3.590 4.124 4.138 4.131 6.129 6.226 6.180
WB Low-income countries 6.666 6.549 3.011 3.631 3.637 3.631 5.553 5.636 5.596
USA 17.382 17.077 16.795 19.273 17.251 18.490 14.792 12.570 13.903
Japan 6.229 6.120 7.525 12.010 12.675 12.092 11.582 12.303 11.701
Germany 6.086 5.980 6.953 6.062 5.590 5.811 5.174 4.640 4.894
United Kingdom 5.025 4.937 5.176 3.855 4.198 4.116 3.177 3.470 3.414
France 5.025 4.937 4.334 3.740 3.847 3.776 3.078 3.143 3.092
Belgium 5.109 5.124 7.009 4.799 4.773 4.834 4.863 4.829 4.890
Netherlands 4.791 4.707 4.402 3.090 3.400 3.357 3.138 3.440 3.398
Venezuela 4.257 4.443 4.853 4.576 4.505 4.472 4.362 4.277 4.251
Italy 4.174 4.101 4.540 3.942 3.899 3.894 3.440 3.362 3.375
Canada 3.633 3.569 4.896 3.658 3.667 3.672 3.390 3.382 3.389
Sweden 3.476 3.415 3.972 3.505 3.627 3.551 3.342 3.460 3.382
Australia 3.226 3.764 4.482 4.627 4.872 4.702 4.820 5.084 4.904
Egypt 3.164 3.108 2.465 2.249 2.479 2.423 2.374 2.621 2.549
Saudi Arabia 3.269 3.211 1.063 0.747 1.015 0.995 0.744 1.014 0.989
Indonesia 3.089 3.035 5.395 4.571 4.625 4.476 5.480 5.582 5.408
Kenya 3.162 3.107 1.364 1.311 1.354 1.333 1.623 1.682 1.650
China 2.980 3.719 5.197 6.513 7.019 6.667 9.903 10.547 10.145
Switzerland 2.800 2.751 2.527 2.435 2.417 2.378 2.533 2.520 2.479
Russia 2.782 2.733 1.519 1.834 1.911 1.844 2.280 2.380 2.301
Iran 2.429 2.387 1.275 1.547 1.689 1.641 2.049 2.217 2.156
Brazil 2.404 2.362 1.518 2.055 1.764 1.958 2.537 2.265 2.450
India 2.391 2.349 1.381 1.859 1.970 1.881 3.254 3.416 3.309
Peru 1.960 1.926 0.942 1.240 1.068 1.161 1.484 1.324 1.411
Rwanda 1.158 1.138 0.420 0.500 0.386 0.477 0.580 0.471 0.558
Assessment criteria
GDP weight is the highest Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The share of the US > 15% Yes Yes Yes No No No
EMEs quota shares is higher Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rebalancing of quotas No No No Yes Yes Yes
Increase in Fund size (times) 27 28 28 30 32 32
Average change in ranking 18 19 18 17 18 17
Sources: IMF and Author's calculations  
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In order to achieve quota rebalancing, more weight is to be put on variables where 
developing countries have higher shares, which are Reserves and Variability. However, these 
two variables are already assigned a total weight of 0.42 by the PCA when considering Data 
Set I, whereas their weight is 0.21 in the (existing) five formulas. Moreover, the Resolution 
explicitly provides that GDP and Openness should have together a significantly high weight. 
Therefore, any set of weights that leans towards higher weight for Reserves and Variability 
would appear as moving away from the content of the Resolution. On the other hand, 
increasing the weight of either GDP or Openness would seem to be more in line with the 
spirit of the Resolution. Accordingly, we propose to examine such alternative sets. 
 
In the PCA, alternative sets of weights are treated as perturbations to the set generated by the 
analysis. In particular attributing specific values to weights leads to a reduction of the 
objectivity and stability of the IES. Krzanowski (1984) shows that perturbations do not affect 
significantly the stability of the first principal component as long as, geometrically speaking, 
the angle θ between the PCA-calculated vector of weights (eigenvector) and the alternative 
vector of weights is less than θm defined as follows:  
2/1
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λλθ pm     (2) 
where  λ1 is the PCA-calculated variance of the first principal component; 
λ1p is the perturbation-calculated variance of the first principal component; and 
λ2 is the PCA-calculated variance of the second principal component. 
 
In line with previous findings on weights, we assume that weights of Openness and 
Variability are well estimated by the PCA and are fixed at 0.22 and 0.23 respectively. Then, 
the weight of GDP is increased progressively until stability of the principal components is no 
more maintained according to Krzanowski’s criterion. Since the weights must add up to one, 
Reserves has the residual weight. 
 
Table 6 shows that the Krazwoski’s criterion is observed up to a weight of GDP between 
0.45 and 0.50. Nevertheless, it is a close call as angles θ are very close each time GDP 
weight is changed. In addition, the rebalancing of quota shares is not achieved in the 
alternative quota formulas as predicted earlier and the increase in the Fund size needed to 
make these alternative quota formulas applicable remains significantly high. We conclude 
that changing the set of weights is not an appropriate way to meet the conditions on quota 
shares and hence the weights generated by the PCA can be considered as the most objective 
weights for a new quota formula. 
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Table 6. Alternative quota formulas for Data Set I 
DS I AQF 1 AQF 2 AQF 3
Weights of variables
GDP, 2002-2004 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Reserves 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05
Openness 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Variability of receipts and net K 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Variation explained by 1st PC (in %) 76.49 75.34 72.59 68.85
Variation explained by 2nd PC (in %) 21.12
Assessment criteria
Maximum angle θm (in degrees) 8.76 15.16 20.56
Effective angle θ (in degrees) 7.90 14.73 20.85
GDP weight is the highest Yes Yes Yes Yes
The share of the US > 15% Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rebalancing of quotas No No No No
Increase in Fund size (times) 27 26 26 25
Average change in ranking 18 18 17 17
Source: Author's calculations  
 
 
Table 7. Evolution of variables weights for Data Set I 
1999 2005
Number of countries 183 184 185 185
Proportion of variance explained by
the 1st principal component (in percent) 87.09 76.49 76.50 75.13
Weights of variables, in percent
GDP 37.35 34.71 34.71 33.92
Openness 24.27 21.56 21.56 21.56
Variability of receipts and net K 21.01 23.49 23.49 24.26
Reserves 17.38 20.24 20.25 20.27
Quota shares, in percent
Advanced economies 67.49 64.97 64.96 63.16
   Major Advanced (G7) 51.46 50.17 50.17 48.02
      USA 18.78 19.27 19.27 18.49
   Other advanced 16.03 14.80 14.80 15.14
Developing countries 27.57 29.58 29.58 30.90
   Africa 2.24 2.60 2.60 2.57
   Asia 14.03 16.45 16.45 17.64
   Middle East 4.82 4.49 4.49 4.67
   Western Hemisphere 6.49 6.04 6.04 6.01
Transition economies 4.94 5.45 5.46 5.94
Emerging markets 22.61 25.22 25.22 26.88
IMF low-income countries 3.58 4.12 4.12 4.02
WB low-income countries 3.08 3.63 3.63 3.53
Source: Author's calculations
2004
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E.   Evolution of Variables Weights 
A note of caution is necessary regarding the use of the PCA. Its output holds only for the 
period of interest. Indeed, the output of a PCA (particularly ranking and weights) is similar to 
a snapshot. It is unlikely to remain the same in other periods. To illustrate this point, the 
principal components approach has been applied to Data Set I at different dates (Table 7). 
 
At the outset, we can see that the output of the PCA for 2004 does not change if there are 184 
or 185 countries in the data set. The proportion explained by the first principal component 
has been on a downward path between 1999 and 2005, although it remains relevant to reflect 
differences between countries. Regarding weights, GDP has the highest weight at all years 
and Reserves the lowest. Interestingly, the weights of GDP and Openness are declining over 
time while those of Variability and Reserves have an opposite trend. 
 
The changes in weights over time are clearly in favor developing and transition countries. 
Indeed, advanced countries, especially G7 countries, are losing economic importance, 
whereas developing and transition countries, notably emerging Asian countries, are 
increasing their presence in the world economy. These findings reinforce the assertion that a 
rebalancing of economic power at country grouping level is taking place and further confirms 
that the PCA yields objective results regarding countries’ relative position in the global 
economic and weights of the variables used for this purpose. 
 
 
F.   Preliminary Assessment of the Principal Components Approach 
The principal components approach yields objective results regarding countries’ relative 
economic importance and the weights of the variables, captures very well developments in 
the world economy. However, using these weights in quota formulas leads to quota 
distributions requiring a significant increase in the size of Fund, whereas the Executive Board 
of the Fund found no need for such increase. Moreover, the political constraints, notably the 
rebalancing of quotas, are not always met. Consequently, we conclude that quota formula is 
likely to continue to guide but not determine the quota structure of the Fund. 
 
This finding regarding the guidance role of the quota formula is not surprising as the 
Resolution hints that one purpose of a new quota formula is to guide further ad hoc quota 
increases in the second phase of the reform on quota and voice. Therefore, we propose to 
examine in the next section this guidance role by simulating ad hoc quota increases, using the 
framework of the Resolution.
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IV.   SIMULATION OF AD HOC QUOTA INCREASES 
The Resolution stipulates that the new quota formulation and increases in basic votes are to 
be undertaken simultaneously during the second phase of the quota and voice reform, with a 
view to undertaking a new round of ad hoc quota increases at the end of this phase. We 
propose to simulate ad hoc quota increases when the PCA-derived quota formulas are used 
and the number of basic votes is augmented. The assessment will be based on the same 
criteria than those used in the previous section plus four new criteria: 
• the voting power of low-income countries is to be preserved at the completion of 
the reform,  
• the voting power of EMEs is to increase, 
• a 15 percent floor for the voting power of the US, and  
• a rebalancing of the voting power from advanced countries to developing and 
transition economies. 
However, before undertaking the simulation, a method to identify countries that are the most 
out-of-line and thus eligible for quota increases is proposed and a quota adjustment 
procedure is then presented. 
 
 
A.   Quota Adjustment Framework 
Eligibility for quota increases 
 
What would certainly matter the most in a quota adjustment exercise is the method to select 
eligible countries for quota increases. Eligible countries are those that are the most out-of-
line and underrepresented with respect to the actual quota distribution. One measure of out-
of-lineness consists in calculating differences between calculated and actual quotas (CAD, 
Table 8). Another measure is the calculated-to-actual ratio (CAR, Table 9). We argue that 
both measures capture very well countries’ out-of-liness. Applying these measures shows 
that 11 countries are in the top 20 underrepresented countries in both difference and ratio.  
 
To get a better view of the out-of-lineness, a scatter plot representation of the two above-
mentioned measures is presented in Figure 3 using Data Set I. The figure displays clear 
outliers, which could be identified as either the most underrepresented or overrepresented 
countries according to both measures.  
 
To select the underrepresented countries, we propose the radar screen or radius method, 
which consists in drawing a circle whose center would be the intersection of the two axes in 
the scatter plot representation, as presented in Figure 3. Countries outside the circle in the 
upper right quadrant –i.e. whose CAD and CAR are positive and distance to the origin of the 
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scatter plot representation is greater than the radius– will be considered as the most out of 
line and underrepresented. Conversely, countries within the circle will be considered as 
broadly in line with the relative position in the world economy. The ideal would be if all 
countries get together (graphically speaking) with a small radius, after quotas adjustment. 
 
Specifically, the distance of any point to the origin of scatter plot representation is calculated 
as follows:  
 
Distance = [ CAD2 + (CAR - 1)2 ]1/2  (3) 
 
The advantage of the radar screen is that it gives a clear visualization of out-of-line countries 
and is based solely on the outcome of the new formula. It is therefore neutral as it treats all 
countries the same way. Another advantage is that it can be applied to any pair of 
quantitative indicators from which a decision is to be made. 
 
 
Figure 3. The radar screen for Data Set I 
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 Source: Author 
 
Adjustment procedure 
 
To bring quotas of most out-of-line countries more in line with their relative position in the 
world economy, we propose to use the uniform proportional reduction (UPR) adjustment 
methodology used for the September 2006 ad hoc quota increases. The objective is to have a 
uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and actual quota shares. In 
24
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other words, the ratio of the difference between the final and the actual quota shares to the 
difference between the calculated and the actual quota shares is the same to eligible 
countries. Let g be that constant; g is defined as follows (see Annex VIII): 
)1(
*
)(
1
1
1
x
xg p
i
ii
p
i
i
+−
−
=
∑
∑
=
=
αβ
α
  (4) 
where αi and βi (i=1,….,p) are the actual quota share and the PCA-calculated quota share 
respectively for eligible countries; and x is the rate of increase in the Fund size; 
 
Size of total quota increases 
 
For the adjustment procedure to work, the size of total quota increases –or the rate of 
increase in the size of the Fund– has to be first determined. In Table 9, lists of eligible 
countries are drawn according to different radiuses for the set of traditional variables. In 
addition, corresponding UPR reduction factors are presented according to various rates of 
total quota increase. The group of eligible countries is diverse in terms of regional 
representation. An interesting finding is the eligibility of advanced countries, notably Japan 
and the United States. One could imagine that those countries will be willing to forego their 
quotas increases in favor of developing countries. The only inconvenience is that both 
countries, especially Japan, would remain significantly underrepresented.  
 
Foregoing of quota increase 
 
This adjustment procedure will be performed with the option that a group of advanced 
countries agrees to forgo their increases in quota shares. In this paper, we choose the G7 
countries. Their acceptance to forgo increases by the G7 is referred to as “G7 goodwill”.  
 
 
B.   Application and Results 
In this simulation, an increase of 10 percent of the total quotas is assumed for all data sets 
and a radius of 0.5 percent is adopted for eligibility purposes. For Data Set I, this entails an 
underrepresentedness reduction (factor g) of around 35 percent for 19 eligible countries out 
of 45 countries with positive CAD and CAR (Table 10). In fact, if eligible G7 countries 
forego their quota increase, the reduction factor g would be higher. Total basic votes are 
increased discretely until a data set satisfies all the constraints set in our approach. Table 11 
shows the results of this simulation exercise when total basic votes are tripled and there is G7 
goodwill. Total basic votes would now represent a share of total voting rights of 5.45 percent 
up from 2.1 percent currently.  
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In the previous section on the formulation of quota, no data set met all quota-related 
constraints. Surprisingly, when constraints on voting power are considered, Data Set I (with 
the four traditional variables) and Data Set III satisfy all the conditions that are: 
• GDP has the highest weight; 
• a rebalancing of quotas is achieved (after adjustment); 
• the quotas and voting power of the emerging market economies has increased (even 
when China is withdrawn from the group); 
• the quotas and voting power of the main shareholder is higher than 15%; 
• a rebalancing of voting power is achieved; and  
• the voting power of LICs is higher. 
 
This finding shows that stand-alone discussions on quotas and simultaneous discussions on 
quotas and basic votes could lead to different decisions. Hence, we conclude that discussions 
on quota formula and basic votes must take place simultaneously in order to better inform 
decision on both issues. 
 
However, this is not free lunch. Indeed, the members’ relative position in the world economy 
as reflected by the IES does not hold anymore. The rankings after quota adjustment are closer 
to the actual rankings than to those of the IES. This suggests that a consensus on a new quota 
structure would come at the cost of a continued misrepresentation of countries’ relative 
economic weights. Hence, it would take several quota reviews to achieve a quota structure 
that reflects real countries’ position in global economy. 
 
 
C.   Additional Remarks 
Number of principal components to retain 
 
At the outset, it may be arguable that only the first principal component be retained for the 
purpose of our analysis, as it accounts for only 75% of the diversity among countries. 
Therefore, one could wonder whether the second principal component could also be 
considered in establishing the IES. This is possible but this would require a special treatment 
of the two sets of weights to derive only one. 
 
Quota adjustment procedure and ranking 
 
In the previous section, priority was to address the out-of-lineness of some countries over the 
preservation of the IES rankings during quota adjustment. The opposite is also feasible but a 
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Table 10. Out-of-line countries and UPR reduction factors using Data Set I 
Radius 1 0.5 0.3 0.1
Countries Japan Japan Japan Japan
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
China China China China
Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland
United States United States United States United States
Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg
Korea Korea Korea Korea
Botswana Botswana Botswana Botswana
Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon
Turkey Turkey Turkey
Thailand Thailand Thailand
Eq. Guinea Eq. Guinea Eq. Guinea
Bhutan Bhutan Bhutan
Spain Spain Spain
Mexico Mexico Mexico
Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia
Estonia Estonia Estonia
U. A. Emirates U. A. Emirates U. A. Emirates
Turkmenistan Turkmenistan
Ethiopia Ethiopia
Czech Republic Czech Republic
San Marino San Marino
Poland Poland
Greece Greece
Denmark
Timor-Leste
Israel
Norway
Slovenia
Slovak Republic
Kiribati
Oman
Lithuania
Portugal
Yemen, Republic of
Cambodia
Cyprus
Angola
Number of countries 9 19 25 39
Sum of actual quota shares 
(∑α), 29.29 34.26 35.75 38.88
in percent
Sum of calculated to actual 
differences (∑(β-α)), 14.66 17.04 17.55 18.17
in percent
Radius 1 0.5 0.3 0.1
Rate of increase in FS, 
in percent
5 23.0 18.4 17.4 16.0
6 27.3 21.8 20.7 19.0
7 31.5 25.2 23.9 22.0
8 35.7 28.6 27.1 24.9
9 39.8 31.9 30.2 27.8
10 43.8 35.1 33.3 30.6
15 62.9 50.3 47.7 43.9
Source: Author's calculations
Underrepresentedness reduction factor, in percent
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specific quota adjustment procedure that preserves rankings will have to be developed. There 
are chances that this would require a larger quota adjustment. 
 
Quota adjustment and economic dynamism 
 
There is a belief that the most dynamic countries should benefit from ad hoc quota increases. 
Yet, the definition of the most dynamic countries is yet to be given. Some countries may 
seem dynamic but the dynamism of a few of them could be such that this smaller set of 
countries captures the bulk of quota increases at the expense of the other dynamic countries 
(see Appendix III for an illustration).  
 
Quota adjustment and appointment of Executive Directors 
 
The simulation exercise has shown that it is possible to reach a consensus on a new quota 
formula using the principal component approach, but only at the level of countries groups. It 
is likely that individual considerations render such a consensus less reachable. For example, 
France and United Kingdom might not be willing to accept that China overtake them in terms 
of voting power although it is clear from the IES that this should be the case. A simple reason 
is that one of these two countries, in our simulation, it would be France, is likely to lose the 
right to appoint an Executive Director in favor of China, should China enter the top 5 in 
quota shares (Article XII, Section (b) (i)). This could influence the way any ad hoc quota 
adjustment will be conducted. 
 
Conditional foregoing 
 
It is assumed in the simulation that G7 members forego any quota increase for the sake of 
meeting the constraints. It is clear that in the absence of such action, a higher increase in 
basic votes will be needed to preserve the voting powers of LICs and ensure a rebalancing of 
voting powers.  
 
The problem of quota foregoing is that it may send a wrong signal about countries relative 
economic size and the case of Japan illustrates clearly such case. Specifically, Japan is the 
most underrepresented G7 member and among the most underrepresented countries in 
general with a calculated to actual difference in voting power of at least 5.46 percent, more 
than the increase in LICs voting power. Therefore, this country’s decision to forego or not its 
quota increase will be instrumental to the completion of reform on quota and voice.  
 
However, one consequence with Japan agreeing to forego quota increases might be that it 
will allow China, an eligible country, to get closer, in terms of quota shares –and hence 
voting power– to Japan, whereas China is likely to be far from reaching Japan’s real level of 
quotas according to the PCA-derived formula. Promoting a conditional foregoing, whereby a 
country agrees to forego part of its quota increases on specific conditions, may help solve this 
30 
 
problem. Such conditions could be a predetermined quota share for the country in question 
and/or the earmarking of forgone quotas for a selected group of countries.  
 
Second-round eligibility 
 
It is worth stressing that, during the quota adjustment process, eligible countries will get a 
quota share increase of g(βi - αi), whereas non-eligible countries will have their quota shares 
reduced by a factor of (1+x)-1, x being the rate of increase in total quotas. Actually, this 
decline will further aggravate the underrepresentedness of those countries –in the upper right 
quadrant of the radar screen in Figure 3– that did not meet the eligibility criterion. A possible 
consequence is that some countries could meet the eligibility criterion after adjustment. In 
our simulation, seven countries (Turkmenistan, Ethiopia, Czech Republic, San Marino, 
Poland, Greece and Germany) find themselves outside the circle after adjustment, i.e. their 
new distance to the origin is greater than the radius retained to select eligible countries. 
Therefore, one might consider a second-round eligibility process, whereby underrepresented 
countries that would meet the eligibility criterion after adjustment be added to list of the 
eligible countries for quota increases. This will ensure that an incontestable non-eligibility of 
the other underrepresented countries. 
 
Concessions 
 
It was noted earlier that the acceptance of a new quota formula by the membership could 
prove difficult if it entails significant changes in the quota structure. For an adhoc quota 
adjustment process to be completed, individual countries will have to make some 
concessions. In this connection, it is worth recalling that non-eligible countries will have 
their quota shares reduced by (1+x)-1, x being the size of total quota increase. The simulation 
considered an increase of 10.0 percent in total quota increases, which is equivalent to a 
decline in quota shares of 9.1 percent for non-eligible countries. This means that the final 
quota shares of non-eligible countries are not linked to the new formula, but to the size of the 
increase in total quotas. Therefore, another challenge of reaching a consensus on the reform 
on quota and voice is to find the size of quota increase that will balance conflicting countries’ 
interests in that process. In particular, for non-eligible countries, there is a limit to which they 
could concede a decline in their quota share, while preserving their interests. To some extent, 
those countries will have to overlook their own interests to ensure the completion of the 
quota and voice reform. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have explored the use of the principal components analysis in advancing the 
debate on quota formulation in the context of the ongoing IMF reform on quota and voice. In 
particular, we have established an indicator of economic size that reflects IMF member 
countries’ relative economic weight in the world economy with a high degree of objectivity. 
In addition, GDP is the variable which is assigned the highest of the weights generated 
automatically by the PCA in all data sets proposed. Another important finding about weights 
is that they did not vary much between 1999 and 2004. More important is that a rebalancing 
of quota shares has taken place in favor of developing countries during the same period.  
 
We have also seen that achieving a rebalancing of quota shares in favor of developing 
countries from the actual quota distribution depend on the measure of the GDP. Notably, no 
rebalancing takes place when GDP is measured at the market exchange rate. Most important, 
all PCA-derived quota formulas would require a significant increase –at least 27 times– in 
total quotas. Moreover, changing weights tends to worsen previous results. For all these 
reasons, we conclude that a quota formula is likely to continue guiding but not determining 
the quota structure of the Fund.  
 
We have therefore used the PCA-quota formulas to simulate ad hoc quota increases using the 
framework of the Resolution. Interestingly, the quota formula with the set of the four 
traditional variables gives the best results in terms of observing the constraints set throughout 
the paper, consistent with the Resolution. In particular, in the case total quotas are increased 
by 10 percent, a tripling of total basic votes would be needed to maintain the voting power of 
low-income countries at their pre-Singapore level. In addition, although the adjusted quota 
structure shows a marginal rebalancing of quota shares, there is a much more significant 
rebalancing of voting power. These achievements, however, come at the cost of a less 
objective representation in countries’ relative positions in the global economy. These 
findings highlight the need to carry on the discussions on quota formula and basic votes 
concomitantly.  
 
The principal components approach also sheds some light on what are the challenges to 
specify a quota formula acceptable by the membership. In particular, the role of the G7 
countries to forego any quota increase or accept significant reduction in their quota shares 
will be critical. Likewise, the extent to which non-eligible countries will concede a decline in 
their quotas shares will be determining. 
 
Our overall assessment is that the principal components approach, as shown in Figure 4, 
provides an objective and transparent means to determine variable weights and countries’ 
relative economic size. Further refinement of this approach will have nevertheless to be 
undertaken. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Resolution 61-5 on Quota and Voice Reform in the 
International Monetary Fund 
 
WHEREAS, the Executive Board has submitted to the Board of Governors a report entitled 
“Quota and Voice Reform in the International Monetary Fund” (hereinafter the “Report”); 
 
WHEREAS, the Executive Board has recommended a two-year reform program to enhance 
the credibility and effectiveness of the Fund, as described in the Report; and 
 
WHEREAS, China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey have requested increases in their quotas to 
better reflect their positions in the world economy and the Executive Board has 
recommended increases in the quotas of these members as a first step in the two-year reform 
program referred to above; 
 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board of Governors hereby RESOLVES that: 
 
1. The quotas of China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey shall be increased to the amounts shown 
against their names in the Annex to this Resolution, provided that a member’s increase in 
quota shall not become effective unless the member in question has consented in writing to 
the increase and has paid to the Fund the full amount of such increase. Each member shall 
pay 25 percent of its increase either in special drawing rights or in the currencies of other 
members specified, with their concurrence, by the Fund, or in any combination of special 
drawing rights and such currencies. The balance of the increase shall be paid by each 
member in its own currency. Both the written consent and the payment of the increase shall 
be made not later than 30 days after the date of this Resolution; provided that the Executive 
Board may extend the period within which the consent and the payment may be made as it 
may determine. 
 
2. The Executive Board is requested to reach agreement on a new quota formula to guide the 
assessment of the adequacy of members’ quotas in the Fund. Such a formula should provide 
a simpler and more transparent means of capturing members’ relative positions in the world 
economy. As a means of achieving this objective, consideration should be given to placing 
significantly higher weight on members’ gross domestic product, together with ensuring that 
other variables, in particular the openness of members’ economies, also play an important 
role. The Executive Board is requested to start discussions on a new quota formula that can 
command broad support soon after the Annual Meetings in Singapore, and to complete its 
work before the Annual Meetings in 2007, and not later than by the Spring 2008 meeting of 
the International Monetary and Financial Committee. 
 
3. The Executive Board is requested, following the completion of its work as provided in 
paragraph 2 above, to recommend to the Board of Governors by the Annual Meetings in 
2007 and no later than by the Annual Meetings of 2008 further increases in the quotas of 
those members that have requested that their quotas be increased, with a view to achieving a 
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significant further alignment of members’ quotas with their relative positions in the world 
economy, based on the new quota formula; any such increases in quotas shall not become 
effective until the amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement that is requested to be 
proposed under paragraph 4 has entered into force. 
 
4. As an integral part of the reform program, and together with its recommendation for 
increases in quotas under paragraph 3, the Executive Board is requested to propose to the 
Board of Governors an amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement that would: (a) 
provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes that each member possesses pursuant to 
Article XII, Section 5(a) of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, and thereby at a minimum 
protect the existing voting share of low income countries as a group and (b) ensure that the 
ratio of the sum of the “basic” votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting 
power remains constant following the increase under (a) above in the event of any 
subsequent changes in the total voting power of members. The Executive Board is requested 
to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007 and no later than the 
Annual Meetings in 2008. 
 
5. In the context of general reviews of quotas conducted after the completion of the steps 
identified in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Board of Governors will consider distributing any 
increase in quotas with a view to achieving better alignment of members’ quotas with their 
relative positions in the world economy, while ensuring that the Fund has adequate liquidity 
to achieve its purposes. 
 
6. The Executive Board is requested to act expeditiously to increase the staffing resources 
available to those Executive Directors elected by a large number of members whose 
workload is particularly heavy. The Executive Board is also requested to give consideration 
to the merits of an amendment of the Articles that would enable each Executive Director 
elected by a large number of members to appoint more than one Alternate Executive 
Director. 
 
7. The Managing Director is invited to work closely with the Executive Board in developing 
the proposals pertaining to the reform package, and to have the staff complete the necessary 
technical work as expeditiously as possible. The Executive Board is requested to report to the 
Board of Governors on progress with the reform package by the time of the 2007 Annual 
Meetings. 
 
 
ANNEX 
Proposed Quota 
(In millions of SDRs) 
 
China   8090.1 
Korea   2927.3 
Mexico   3152.8 
Turkey   1191.3 
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APPENDIX II 
 
An Example of Principal Components Analysis 
 
We perform PCA on traditional variables in shares. As we can see in Table 1, there is not a 
significant difference in the variances of variables, with the highest variance being 2.40 times 
greater than lowest variance. Accordingly, we perform our PCA on the covariance matrix,9  
 
Appendix Table 1 – Statistics of dispersion 
 Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
GDP 0.54 2.53 0.00 30.35
Reserves 0.54 2.25 0.00 25.27
Openness 0.54 1.62 0.00 15.80
Variability 0.54 1.73 0.00 20.37  
 
Although the PCA is on the covariance matrix (Table 2), a look at the correlation matrix 
shows that three variables (GDP, Openness, Variability) out of four are highly correlated 
(more than 0.90) to each other while Reserves correlation with other variables is much lower 
at around 0.45. 
 
Appendix Table 2 – Matrix of correlations 
GDP Reserves Openness Variability
GDP 1.00
Reserves 0.45 1.00
Openness 0.92 0.44 1.00
Variability 0.97 0.42 0.93 1.00  
 
Launching the PCA, we note that the loadings of the first principal component, which are 
correlations between the original variables and this component, are very high – consistent 
with the correlation matrix – at more than 0.94 for GDP, Openness, and Variability as shown 
in Table 3. The loading for Reserves is however around one third lower, although it is 
considered as high in practice. We conclude that all variables could be retained for the 
purpose of the analysis.  
 
Appendix Table 3 – Correlations between variables and principal components 
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4
GDP -0.97 0.22 0.11 -0.06
Reserves -0.63 -0.77 0.00 0.00
Openness -0.94 0.19 -0.29 -0.05
Variability -0.96 0.24 0.01 0.16  
 
                                                 
9 In case the variance was much higher, one would have to perform the PCA using the correlation matrix which 
is a covariance matrix for standardized variables, instead of the covariance matrix, in order to avoid that the first 
principal component is oriented in the direction of the variable with the highest variance. 
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In addition, the first principal component explains a large part of the variance of GDP, 
Reserves and Variability – which can be seen by squaring each loading in the first principal 
component. Only Reserves is not well captured by the first principal component with only 
40% of the variance of the variable. 
 
Table 4 shows that the first component has a large variance, accounting for 77% of the total 
variance in the data set, which is very good, and the second component accounts for 21% of 
the total variance, such that both components captures 98% of the total variance. This 
situation is typical for highly correlated variables. Since the eigenvalue of the first principal 
component is significantly high, we retain only this component for the purpose of our 
analysis. 
 
Appendix Table 4 – Eigenvalues 
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4
Eigenvalue 13.013 3.592 0.299 0.108
Variance Prop. 0.765 0.211 0.018 0.006
Cumulative Prop. 0.765 0.976 0.994 1.000  
 
Moreover, as the first component explains 77% of the variance of the four variables, and has 
large correlations with all variables, this component clearly exhibits an overall size 
dimension among the countries; which in our case, given the nature of our variables, could be 
interpreted as the economic importance in the global economy. The second component in 
such circumstances highlights contrasts between the countries. As Reserves is highly 
correlated with that component, the latter therefore displays shows contrast between 
countries of high economic importance, USA on one side and China and Japan in the other 
side, with respect to the level of reserves (see Figure 1 in the main text). 
 
A look at the coefficients of variables in Table 5 indicates that GDP has the highest weight 
among variables while Reserves has the lowest, with respect to the first principal component. 
These coefficients will be normalized, i.e. transformed such that they add up to one, and will 
serve as weights in a quota formula. 
 
Appendix Table 5 - Eigenvectors 
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4
GDP -0.677 0.287 0.511 0.446
Reserves -0.395 -0.918 0.012 -0.023
Openness -0.420 0.163 -0.859 0.242
Variability -0.458 0.219 0.023 -0.861  
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APPENDIX III 
 
Temporal Paths of Countries’ Economic Size 
 
Relative economic size varies with time, reflecting the development and growth of a country 
in comparison with other countries. The IES shows that some countries have significantly 
increased their importance in the world economy over decades. An illustration of these 
changes is observable through the drawing of temporal paths of individual country’s relative 
economic size using the PCA or more specifically the technique of illustrative or 
supplementary observations. This technique enables to know the position of some countries 
on the principal components determined by other countries. In our case, the technique allows 
observing temporal paths of any country’s relative position, with respect to the actual 
situation. More precisely, it would be possible to display a country’s relative position at 
different dates, given the present structure of relative economic size.10 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Temporal paths of China, France, Korea and UK, 1979-2004 
 
 
As it could not be possible to show all countries’ temporal paths in one figure, we selected a 
few countries that would illustrate what we referred to as lost of economic importance or 
rising importance in the international scene. Figure 3 shows the temporal paths of China 
                                                 
10 Lai (2000) uses another methodology consisting in performing multiple PCAs with data at various dates. The 
temporal paths are assessed through the evolution of a country’s scores on the first principal component. We did 
not use this methodology here as the membership of the Fund changed significantly over the last 30 years. 
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(CHI), France (FRA), Korea (KOR) and UK in the plane formed by the first two principal 
components, using data used for the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh general review of 
quotas as well as data used for the ad hoc quota increases in September 2006. 
 
Going leftward meaning increasing relative importance, we can see that China’s and Korea’s 
paths go in that direction while France’s and UK’s temporal paths go in the opposite 
direction indicating a continuous decline of its relative importance. In particular, China 
outruns France and UK at some point between 1993 and 2004. In addition, as all three 
countries are among the top 20 most important countries, the downward orientation of 
China’s and Korea’s time paths indicate that international trade–which is reflected in a 
continuous accumulation of reserves– is playing an important role in their rising importance. 
 
This is a good illustration of the fact that despite continued positive growth, France and UK 
have lost relative importance in favor of a country (China) that has been more dynamic over 
the time period of interest.11 
 
                                                 
11 We have been using the PCA with the five variables in the existing quota formulas. 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Determination of the Quota of a New Member: 
The Case of Montenegro 
 
On July 18, 2006, Montenegro officially applied for Fund membership. This application has 
been examined by a committee set up by the Executive Board of the Fund. The committee 
recommended the approval of the application. The Executive Board accepted Montenegro’s 
membership, with an initial quota share of 0.0127 percent – standing at the 159th place.  
 
However, the existing process of determining the quotas of new members is rather complex 
and highly subjective, involving the use of country comparators and a lot of judgment 
regarding comparison factors, to ensure that the recommended quota fits well within the 
existing structure of quota. The principal component approach offers a simpler means to 
determine a new member’s quota by establishing its ranking according to the IES and then 
using the derived quota formula to determine its quota. Applying this methodology with the 
traditional variables using data in Statistical Appendix I, Montenegro stands at the 155th 
place between Liberia and Malawi with a calculated quota share of 0.007 percent.  
 
Appendix Table 6. Data for Quota Calculations under DS I (in percent) 
 
GDP, 2002-2004 0.006
Openness, average for 2000-2004 0.008
Variability, 1992-2004 0.011
Reserves, 2004 0.005
Source: IMF  
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APPENDIX V 
 
Classification of Countries 
 
WB Low-Income Countries
Afghanistan Gambia, The Mauritania Somalia 
Bangladesh Ghana Mongolia Sudan 
Benin Guinea Mozambique Tajikistan 
Bhutan Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Tanzania 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nepal Timor-Leste 
Burundi India Niger Togo 
Cambodia Kenya Nigeria Uganda 
C.A.R.  Korea, Dem Rep. Pakistan Uzbekistan 
Chad Kyrgyz Republic Papua New Guinea Vietnam 
Comoros Lao PDR Rwanda Yemen, Rep. 
Congo, Dem. Rep Liberia Sao Tome and Principe Zambia 
Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar Senegal Zimbabwe 
Eritrea Malawi Sierra Leone 
Ethiopia Mali Solomon Islands 
IMF Low-Income Countries (PRGF Eligible countries)
Afghanistan Djibouti Madagascar Solomon Islands
Albania Dominica Malawi Somalia
Angola Eritrea Maldives Sri Lanka 
Armenia Ethiopia Mali St. Lucia 
Azerbaijan Gambia, The Mauritania St. Vincent and the Grenad
Bangladesh Georgia Moldova Sudan 
Benin Ghana Mongolia Tajikistan 
Bhutan Grenada Mozambique Tanzania 
Bolivia Guinea Myanmar Timor Leste
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Nepal Togo 
Burundi Guyana Nicaragua Tonga
Cambodia Haiti Niger Uganda 
Cameroon Honduras Nigeria Uzbekistan 
Cape Verde India Pakistan Vanuatu 
Central African Republic Kenya Papua New Guinea Vietnam 
Chad 4 Kiribati Rwanda Yemen, Republic of
Comoros Kyrgyz Republic Samoa Zambia 
Congo, D. R. Lao, P.D.R. Sao Tomé and Principe Zimbabwe 
Congo, Republic of Lesotho Senegal 
Côte d'Ivoire Liberia Sierra Leone 
Emerging Market Economies (Morgan Stanley)
Argentina Egypt Malaysia South Africa
Brazil Hungary Mexico Poland
Chile India Morooco Russia
China Indonesia Pakistan Thailand
Colombia Israel Peru Turkey
Czech Republic Jordan Philippines  
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Variables Used for Calculations 
Quota 
shares 
before 
Singapore
Quota 
shares 
after 
Singapore
Calculated 
quotas 
(F5)
Hybrid 
GDP Reserves
Current 
payments
Current 
receipts
Current 
payments 
plus 
current 
receipts
Variability 
of current 
receipts 
and net 
capital 
inflows
Variabiliy 
of current 
receipts
Hybrid 
Variability
2004 2002-04 2004 2002-04 2002-2004 2004 2000-04 2000-04 2000-04 1992-2004 1992-2004 1992-2004
United States 17.382 17.077 16.795 28.719 30.350 20.471 20.691 20.258 2.705 18.138 13.416 15.797 20.374 11.826 17.372
Japan 6.229 6.120 7.525 11.428 11.822 6.624 6.792 7.869 25.267 4.972 6.284 5.623 6.725 7.049 6.085
Germany 6.086 5.980 6.953 6.733 6.568 4.318 4.484 4.390 1.726 8.400 8.894 8.645 6.682 4.806 5.697
France 5.025 4.937 4.334 5.009 4.818 3.112 3.210 3.207 1.166 4.985 5.192 5.087 3.131 3.815 3.293
United Kingdom 5.025 4.937 5.176 5.220 5.019 3.102 3.158 3.341 1.337 6.375 6.172 6.275 2.083 3.655 3.155
China 3.301 3.244 3.442 4.107 3.943 2.879 2.992 2.929 1.047 4.084 4.071 4.077 1.882 2.182 1.884
Italy 3.269 3.211 1.063 0.613 0.596 0.573 0.566 0.555 0.740 0.738 0.980 0.858 0.877 2.384 2.057
Saudi Arabia 2.980 2.928 3.098 2.427 2.364 1.853 1.893 1.853 1.114 3.365 3.629 3.496 2.245 3.530 3.047
Canada 2.980 3.719 5.197 4.616 4.544 15.158 14.460 14.158 15.485 4.982 5.134 5.057 3.027 3.530 3.047
Russia 2.782 2.733 1.519 1.423 1.231 2.577 2.520 2.467 2.848 1.168 1.575 1.370 2.279 2.724 2.352
Netherlands 2.415 2.373 2.880 1.485 1.441 0.870 0.903 0.959 0.362 3.261 3.521 3.390 1.381 3.123 2.696
Belgium 2.155 2.117 2.088 0.875 0.837 0.555 0.569 0.557 0.346 2.287 2.432 2.359 1.189 2.218 1.914
India 1.945 1.911 1.200 1.632 1.586 5.852 5.717 5.597 3.596 0.998 1.042 1.020 0.787 0.838 0.723
Switzerland 1.618 1.590 1.530 0.878 0.873 0.406 0.421 0.581 1.633 1.531 1.896 1.712 1.485 1.518 1.310
Australia 1.514 1.488 1.182 1.556 1.429 1.064 1.080 1.058 1.049 1.259 1.063 1.162 1.054 1.336 1.153
Mexico 1.427 1.402 2.250 2.545 2.369 1.820 1.852 1.813 0.454 2.761 2.567 2.664 1.908 1.574 1.627
Spain 1.421 1.396 0.998 1.478 1.432 2.635 2.670 2.614 1.586 0.938 0.869 0.903 1.878 0.874 1.602
Brazil 1.244 1.222 0.415 0.267 0.261 0.262 0.253 0.247 0.573 0.250 0.348 0.299 0.685 1.032 0.890
Korea 1.210 1.449 1.928 1.656 1.800 1.797 1.823 1.785 1.932 2.123 2.022 2.073 2.128 2.032 1.815
Venezuela 1.121 1.101 1.229 0.857 0.817 0.455 0.463 0.544 0.651 1.298 1.474 1.385 0.945 1.360 1.174
Sweden 0.991 0.973 0.396 0.374 0.350 0.857 0.825 0.808 0.523 0.373 0.395 0.384 1.040 0.605 0.887
Argentina 0.973 0.956 0.767 0.631 0.635 1.594 1.591 1.557 1.086 0.688 0.770 0.729 1.110 1.184 1.022
Indonesia 0.876 0.861 1.142 0.720 0.690 0.466 0.479 0.469 0.264 1.411 1.415 1.413 0.760 0.762 0.658
Austria 0.874 0.859 0.436 0.525 0.445 0.943 0.956 0.936 0.311 0.469 0.461 0.465 0.502 0.490 0.428
South Africa 0.820 0.806 0.309 0.158 0.152 0.289 0.282 0.276 0.369 0.178 0.246 0.211 0.498 0.783 0.676
Nigeria 0.782 0.769 0.868 0.621 0.608 0.327 0.336 0.404 1.261 0.704 1.001 0.851 1.180 1.293 1.116
Norway 0.769 0.755 1.078 0.597 0.573 0.317 0.327 0.381 1.138 0.990 1.055 1.023 1.177 1.577 1.362
Denmark 0.765 1.346 2.508 1.663 1.675 1.653 1.664 1.629 5.376 2.250 2.407 2.328 2.498 3.046 2.629
Iran 0.700 0.688 0.404 0.383 0.375 0.906 0.896 0.877 0.927 0.303 0.370 0.336 0.296 0.750 0.647
Malaysia 0.696 0.684 1.399 0.290 0.290 0.475 0.468 0.458 1.721 1.106 1.228 1.166 1.187 1.561 1.348
Kuwait 0.646 0.635 0.351 0.136 0.127 0.078 0.076 0.085 0.231 0.174 0.307 0.240 0.414 0.939 0.811
Ukraine 0.642 0.631 0.277 0.158 0.141 0.554 0.522 0.511 0.294 0.255 0.290 0.272 0.314 0.379 0.327
Poland 0.641 0.629 0.739 0.617 0.608 0.831 0.830 0.813 1.107 0.785 0.728 0.757 0.971 0.786 0.828
Finland 0.591 0.581 0.546 0.455 0.438 0.277 0.281 0.291 0.350 0.590 0.693 0.641 0.641 0.532 0.546
Algeria 0.587 0.577 0.325 0.202 0.186 0.391 0.388 0.380 1.154 0.158 0.250 0.204 0.478 0.705 0.609
Turkey 0.556 0.546 0.246 0.063 0.052 0.063 0.052 0.035 0.115 0.166 0.162 0.164 0.348 0.598 0.516
Iraq 0.526 0.517 0.228 0.078 0.069 0.111 0.110 0.108 0.695 0.111 0.151 0.131 0.345 0.503 0.434
Libya 0.506 0.497 0.909 0.396 0.394 0.909 0.895 0.877 1.360 0.871 0.962 0.916 1.133 1.026 0.966
Thailand 0.486 0.477 0.468 0.246 0.227 0.284 0.286 0.280 0.419 0.548 0.503 0.526 0.481 0.359 0.410
Hungary 0.484 0.475 0.191 0.252 0.245 0.650 0.639 0.626 0.344 0.173 0.197 0.185 0.250 0.193 0.213
Pakistan 0.482 0.473 0.207 0.179 0.160 0.314 0.306 0.300 0.328 0.232 0.209 0.221 0.271 0.175 0.231
Romania 0.451 0.548 0.741 0.739 0.658 0.936 0.909 0.890 1.078 0.747 0.698 0.723 1.677 1.011 1.430
Egypt 0.442 0.434 0.248 0.187 0.222 0.503 0.508 0.497 0.424 0.231 0.248 0.240 0.356 0.317 0.304
Israel 0.434 0.427 0.579 0.286 0.303 0.262 0.266 0.260 0.830 0.550 0.559 0.555 0.586 0.713 0.616
New Zealand 0.419 0.411 0.229 0.239 0.215 0.171 0.172 0.168 0.139 0.268 0.245 0.256 0.240 0.225 0.205
Philippines 0.412 0.405 0.504 0.211 0.222 0.684 0.679 0.665 0.422 0.461 0.501 0.481 0.580 0.741 0.640
Portugal 0.406 0.399 0.528 0.410 0.398 0.349 0.365 0.358 0.186 0.630 0.549 0.590 0.628 0.607 0.536
Singapore 0.404 0.397 1.922 0.261 0.263 0.205 0.203 0.198 3.212 1.188 1.402 1.294 2.105 2.107 1.819
Chile 0.401 0.393 0.298 0.230 0.214 0.315 0.314 0.307 0.498 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.383 0.351 0.327
Ireland 0.392 0.385 1.677 0.451 0.422 0.276 0.277 0.281 0.088 1.579 1.604 1.591 3.065 2.726 2.613
Greece 0.385 0.378 0.456 0.508 0.468 0.416 0.417 0.409 0.088 0.544 0.463 0.504 0.928 0.537 0.791
Czech Republic 0.383 0.376 0.538 0.264 0.247 0.311 0.313 0.307 0.838 0.590 0.555 0.573 0.595 0.368 0.507
Colombia 0.362 0.356 0.208 0.241 0.237 0.560 0.563 0.552 0.369 0.207 0.203 0.205 0.285 0.209 0.243
Bulgaria 0.299 0.294 0.113 0.059 0.054 0.117 0.116 0.114 0.218 0.117 0.106 0.112 0.129 0.109 0.110
Peru 0.299 0.293 0.139 0.168 0.170 0.274 0.274 0.269 0.337 0.131 0.122 0.127 0.286 0.120 0.244
United Arab Emirates 0.286 0.281 0.461 0.255 0.244 0.214 0.205 0.201 0.554 0.347 0.439 0.393 0.585 0.858 0.741
Morocco 0.275 0.270 0.165 0.122 0.118 0.232 0.232 0.228 0.452 0.161 0.175 0.168 0.131 0.106 0.112
Bangladesh 0.249 0.245 0.103 0.136 0.143 0.499 0.494 0.484 0.089 0.110 0.114 0.112 0.069 0.076 0.066
Congo, Dem. Republic of 0.249 0.245 0.025 0.016 0.016 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.007 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.575 0.052 0.490
Zambia 0.229 0.225 0.022 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.051 0.043 0.043
Serbia / Montenegro 0.219 0.215 0.111 0.059 0.055 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.129 0.080 0.062 0.071 0.162 0.287 0.248
Sri Lanka 0.193 0.190 0.074 0.049 0.050 0.141 0.140 0.137 0.064 0.084 0.082 0.083 0.066 0.074 0.064
Belarus 0.181 0.177 0.118 0.056 0.050 0.121 0.116 0.113 0.021 0.114 0.111 0.113 0.112 0.197 0.170
Ghana 0.173 0.170 0.043 0.023 0.021 0.090 0.089 0.087 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.042 0.066 0.057 0.056
Kazakhstan 0.171 0.168 0.164 0.100 0.086 0.091 0.092 0.187 0.190 0.151 0.148 0.150 0.235 0.257 0.222
Croatia 0.171 0.168 0.144 0.084 0.078 0.199 0.191 0.090 0.250 0.156 0.146 0.151 0.179 0.130 0.152
Slovak Republic 0.168 0.165 0.231 0.101 0.089 0.143 0.142 0.139 0.396 0.228 0.220 0.224 0.183 0.261 0.225
Zimbabwe 0.165 0.162 0.026 0.014 0.040 0.057 0.064 0.063 0.009 0.027 0.023 0.025 0.014 0.041 0.035
Trinidad and Tobago 0.157 0.154 0.062 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.086 0.050 0.058 0.054 0.068 0.102 0.088
Vietnam 0.154 0.151 0.214 0.123 0.117 0.404 0.394 0.385 0.205 0.242 0.241 0.241 0.114 0.190 0.164
Cote d'Ivoire 0.152 0.149 0.061 0.039 0.038 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.059 0.062 0.060 0.050 0.089 0.076
Sudan 0.147 0.145 0.040 0.054 0.047 0.135 0.134 0.131 0.037 0.043 0.035 0.039 0.041 0.036 0.035
Uruguay 0.144 0.141 0.047 0.032 0.034 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.071 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.168 0.078 0.143
Ecuador 0.141 0.139 0.078 0.070 0.067 0.096 0.095 0.093 0.033 0.089 0.086 0.088 0.362 0.088 0.308
Syrian Arab Republic 0.138 0.135 0.122 0.286 0.278 0.120 0.122 0.185 0.001 0.076 0.087 0.082 0.103 0.140 0.121
Tunisia 0.134 0.132 0.105 0.069 0.068 0.065 0.063 0.134 0.107 0.125 0.120 0.122 0.097 0.067 0.083
Angola 0.134 0.131 0.193 0.048 0.039 0.138 0.136 0.062 0.025 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.449 0.641 0.554
Luxembourg 0.131 0.128 1.375 0.078 0.073 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.008 0.776 0.812 0.794 0.881 1.085 0.936
Uzbekistan 0.129 0.127 0.043 0.027 0.027 0.084 0.084 0.082 0.059 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.109 0.062 0.093
Jamaica 0.128 0.126 0.051 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.053 0.059 0.052 0.056 0.073 0.028 0.063
Kenya 0.127 0.125 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.056 0.031 0.048
Qatar 0.124 0.121 0.134 0.070 0.064 0.041 0.039 0.042 0.098 0.094 0.150 0.122 0.193 0.254 0.220
Myanmar 0.121 0.119 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.155 0.151 0.148 0.020 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.052 0.055 0.048
Yemen, Republic of 0.114 0.112 0.117 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.165 0.051 0.059 0.055 0.295 0.361 0.312
Slovenia 0.109 0.107 0.144 0.080 0.075 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.257 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.096 0.102 0.088
Dominican Republic 0.102 0.101 0.085 0.045 0.052 0.107 0.112 0.109 0.016 0.089 0.099 0.094 0.087 0.115 0.100
Brunei Darussalam 0.101 0.099 0.058 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.040 0.057 0.048 0.172 0.117 0.146
Guatemala 0.098 0.097 0.065 0.066 0.068 0.095 0.097 0.095 0.093 0.074 0.065 0.069 0.073 0.046 0.063
Panama 0.097 0.095 0.049 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.024 0.056 0.052 0.054 0.099 0.056 0.084
Lebanon 0.095 0.093 0.176 0.053 0.055 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.401 0.148 0.094 0.121 0.278 0.314 0.271
Tanzania 0.093 0.091 0.033 0.028 0.029 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.062 0.027 0.031 0.029 0.052 0.056 0.048
Oman 0.091 0.089 0.150 0.061 0.061 0.068 0.069 0.067 0.110 0.111 0.129 0.120 0.159 0.309 0.267
Source: IMF
GDP PPPGDP
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Quota 
shares 
before 
Singapore
Quota 
shares 
after 
Singapore
Calculated 
quotas 
(F5)
Hybrid 
GDP Reserves
Current 
payments
Current 
receipts
Current 
payments 
plus 
current 
receipts
Variability 
of current 
receipts 
and net 
capital 
inflows
Variabiliy 
of current 
receipts
Hybrid 
Variability
2004 2002-04 2004 2002-04 2002-2004 2004 2000-04 2000-04 2000-04 1992-2004 1992-2004 1992-2004
Cameroon 0.087 0.086 0.033 0.045 0.040 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.021 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.056 0.041 0.048
Uganda 0.085 0.083 0.025 0.017 0.018 0.071 0.070 0.069 0.036 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.039 0.047 0.041
Bolivia 0.080 0.079 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.031 0.025 0.026
El Salvador 0.080 0.079 0.053 0.039 0.041 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.054 0.056 0.066 0.057
Jordan 0.080 0.079 0.082 0.028 0.028 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.159 0.077 0.082 0.079 0.087 0.047 0.075
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.079 0.078 0.066 0.020 0.019 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.063 0.055 0.048 0.052 0.093 0.119 0.103
Costa Rica 0.077 0.075 0.084 0.045 0.048 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.054 0.092 0.085 0.088 0.087 0.109 0.094
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic 0.076 0.074 0.042 0.014 0.014 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.035 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.120 0.119 0.102
Senegal 0.076 0.074 0.024 0.019 0.018 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.018
Azerbaijan 0.075 0.074 0.036 0.021 0.020 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.027 0.042 0.032 0.037 0.050 0.045 0.042
Gabon 0.072 0.071 0.047 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.009 0.028 0.036 0.032 0.077 0.132 0.114
Georgia 0.070 0.069 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.009 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.020
Lithuania 0.067 0.066 0.096 0.055 0.050 0.078 0.076 0.075 0.106 0.095 0.087 0.091 0.085 0.132 0.114
Cyprus 0.066 0.064 0.061 0.038 0.035 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.107 0.068 0.064 0.066 0.098 0.042 0.084
Namibia 0.064 0.063 0.024 0.013 0.011 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.044 0.038
Bahrain 0.063 0.062 0.144 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.058 0.105 0.111 0.108 0.237 0.308 0.265
Ethiopia 0.063 0.062 0.076 0.023 0.021 0.097 0.096 0.094 0.037 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.284 0.312 0.269
Papua New Guinea 0.062 0.061 0.028 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.040 0.052 0.045
Bahamas, The 0.061 0.060 0.029 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.033 0.028 0.030 0.025 0.039 0.033
Nicaragua 0.061 0.060 0.021 0.013 0.012 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.019 0.026 0.021 0.023 0.029 0.015 0.025
Honduras 0.061 0.060 0.037 0.018 0.019 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.051 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.032 0.035 0.030
Liberia 0.060 0.059 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.017 0.010 0.015
Latvia 0.059 0.058 0.053 0.034 0.031 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.051 0.061 0.054 0.057 0.049 0.057 0.049
Moldova 0.058 0.057 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.025 0.033 0.029
Madagascar 0.057 0.056 0.022 0.011 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.037 0.053 0.045
Iceland 0.055 0.054 0.035 0.030 0.028 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.029 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.050 0.016 0.043
Mozambique 0.053 0.052 0.025 0.015 0.014 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.030 0.024 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.038 0.033
Guinea 0.050 0.049 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.015
Sierra Leone 0.049 0.048 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.009 0.010
Malta 0.048 0.047 0.058 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.084 0.050 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.055 0.048
Mauritius 0.048 0.047 0.032 0.016 0.015 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.049 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.029 0.033 0.028
Paraguay 0.047 0.046 0.039 0.018 0.017 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.068 0.076 0.066
Mali 0.044 0.043 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.027 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.014
Suriname 0.043 0.042 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.020 0.018 0.017
Armenia 0.043 0.042 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.011
Guyana 0.043 0.042 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.029 0.035 0.031
Kyrgyz Republic 0.042 0.041 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.018 0.017 0.016
Cambodia 0.041 0.040 0.055 0.012 0.012 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.028 0.036 0.033 0.034 0.117 0.134 0.116
Tajikistan 0.041 0.040 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.016
Congo, Republic of 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.021 0.026 0.023 0.060 0.065 0.056
Haiti 0.038 0.038 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.002 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.025 0.022 0.021
Somalia 0.038 0.038 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Rwanda 0.037 0.037 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.017 0.020 0.017
Burundi 0.036 0.035 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.008
Turkmenistan 0.035 0.034 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.064 0.058 0.056 0.085 0.034 0.038 0.036 0.061 0.099 0.085
Togo 0.034 0.034 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.012
Nepal 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.009 0.009 0.065 0.045 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.029 0.025 0.024
Fiji 0.033 0.032 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.066 0.067 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.015
Malawi 0.032 0.032 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.007
Macedonia, FYR 0.032 0.032 0.028 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.039 0.043 0.037
Barbados 0.032 0.031 0.015 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.014
Niger 0.031 0.030 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.036 0.035 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.011 0.012
Estonia 0.030 0.030 0.067 0.027 0.025 0.018 0.019 0.034 0.045 0.074 0.067 0.071 0.053 0.075 0.064
Mauritania 0.030 0.029 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.012
Botswana 0.029 0.029 0.054 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.169 0.037 0.043 0.040 0.066 0.076 0.065
Benin 0.029 0.029 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.030 0.030 0.014 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006
Burkina Faso 0.028 0.028 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.017 0.022 0.019
Chad 0.026 0.026 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.032 0.035 0.030
Central African Republic 0.026 0.026 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.007
Lao, People's Dem. Republic 0.025 0.024 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.013
Mongolia 0.024 0.023 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.014 0.011 0.012
Swaziland 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.034 0.029
Albania 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.021 0.018 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.036 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.048 0.041
Lesotho 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.019 0.016
Equatorial Guinea 0.015 0.015 0.039 0.013 0.009 0.032 0.027 0.026 0.016 0.039 0.032 0.035 0.050 0.068 0.058
Gambia, The 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004
Belize 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006
San Marino 0.008 0.008 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.029 0.025
Vanuatu 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.005
Djibouti 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
Eritrea 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.016
St. Lucia 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
Guinea-Bissau 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.015 0.013
Antigua and Barbuda 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.010
Grenada 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
Samoa 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
Solomon Islands 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004
Cape Verde 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.006
Comoros 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002
Seychelles 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.007
St. Vincent and the Grenadin 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
Dominica 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Maldives 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.003
Timor-Leste 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.012
Sao Tome and Principe 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Tonga 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002
Bhutan 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
Kiribati 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003
Marshall Islands 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Palau, Republic of                  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004
Source: IMF
GDP PPPGDP
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Indicator of Economic Size - The Ranking 
Country Actual DS I DS II DS III DS IV DS V DS VI Country Actual DS I DS II DS III DS IV DS V DS VI
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Cameroon 93 105 106 106 105 104 106
Japan 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Uganda 94 113 114 116 108 103 108
Germany 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 Bolivia 95 116 121 118 116 119 119
France 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 El Salvador 96 93 90 92 98 95 96
United Kingdom 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 Jordan 96 77 77 79 77 78 80
China 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina 98 90 87 89 92 88 92
Italy 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 Costa Rica 99 83 79 81 85 82 84
Saudi Arabia 8 30 22 22 29 23 25 Afghanistan, Islamic Repub 100 97 100 104 97 98 101
Canada 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 Senegal 100 120 117 120 119 118 120
Russia 10 12 12 13 10 10 10 Azerbaijan 102 111 110 111 109 109 110
Netherlands 11 14 10 10 16 13 14 Gabon 103 110 101 103 114 111 112
Belgium 12 20 17 18 24 18 18 Georgia 104 130 133 134 131 131 131
India 13 13 14 14 7 8 8 Lithuania 105 78 74 76 80 76 78
Switzerland 14 17 16 17 17 17 17 Cyprus 106 82 85 82 87 89 86
Australia 15 19 18 19 22 21 21 Namibia 107 128 126 127 128 125 125
Mexico 16 10 11 11 12 12 12 Bahrain 108 73 72 74 75 72 74
Spain 17 11 13 12 14 16 16 Ethiopia 109 76 76 78 73 73 76
Brazil 18 16 19 16 13 15 13 Papua New Guinea 110 125 122 123 122 120 121
Korea 19 8 8 8 8 7 7 Bahamas, The 111 123 120 121 127 126 126
Venezuela 20 40 34 37 40 38 38 Nicaragua 111 126 128 128 121 124 122
Sweden 21 23 23 23 28 28 27 Honduras 111 109 107 110 111 108 111
Argentina 22 31 38 33 30 33 32 Liberia 114 155 164 157 158 169 161
Indonesia 23 27 26 28 19 20 20 Latvia 115 98 92 97 101 97 100
Austria 24 29 30 30 31 31 31 Moldova 116 135 132 133 134 132 132
South Africa 25 39 40 41 33 36 35 Madagascar 117 127 124 124 124 123 124
Nigeria 26 47 45 45 50 45 46 Iceland 118 106 111 107 113 121 117
Norway 27 24 25 26 26 27 28 Mozambique 119 124 119 122 117 115 115
Denmark 28 25 24 24 27 25 26 Guinea 120 142 144 144 133 134 135
Iran 29 36 31 31 32 30 30 Sierra Leone 121 156 160 160 156 158 157
Malaysia 30 22 20 21 20 19 19 Malta 122 101 93 98 104 100 102
Kuwait 31 52 46 46 57 52 52 Mauritius 122 112 109 112 112 113 113
Ukraine 32 51 51 52 49 46 48 Paraguay 124 107 105 108 107 102 107
Poland 33 28 29 29 25 29 29 Mali 125 129 129 129 129 127 128
Finland 34 34 35 35 39 40 40 Suriname 126 151 151 151 139 144 143
Algeria 35 37 33 36 35 32 33 Armenia 126 137 136 136 149 147 150
Turkey 36 21 28 25 21 26 23 Guyana 128 138 140 139 142 141 141
Iraq 37 60 58 59 64 61 62 Kyrgyz Republic 129 141 143 142 137 137 137
Libya 38 48 48 48 51 50 51 Cambodia 130 99 95 99 95 94 95
Thailand 39 26 27 27 23 22 22 Tajikistan 131 144 145 145 147 148 149
Hungary 40 44 44 44 43 43 43 Congo, Republic of 132 121 125 125 126 130 130
Pakistan 41 50 52 51 47 48 47 Haiti 133 136 141 137 132 135 133
Romania 42 53 54 53 52 53 53 Somalia 133 180 179 180 181 181 181
Egypt 43 46 49 49 45 44 45 Rwanda 135 149 146 147 141 140 140
Israel 44 32 32 32 36 34 34 Burundi 136 168 166 168 159 157 158
New Zealand 45 55 55 56 60 62 60 Turkmenistan 137 92 86 88 91 84 89
Philippines 46 43 41 42 37 35 36 Togo 138 147 147 146 145 146 147
Portugal 47 38 39 40 41 41 42 Nepal 139 115 116 117 110 105 109
Singapore 48 15 15 15 15 14 15 Fiji 140 143 138 141 151 143 145
Chile 49 45 47 47 46 47 49 Malawi 141 153 153 153 144 145 144
Ireland 50 18 21 20 18 24 24 Macedonia, FYR 141 118 118 119 123 122 123
Greece 51 35 43 38 38 49 41 Barbados 143 131 134 132 135 136 136
Czech Republic 52 33 36 34 34 37 37 Niger 144 148 148 149 146 149 148
Colombia 53 49 50 50 48 51 50 Estonia 145 96 91 95 102 96 98
Bulgaria 54 69 70 72 66 66 66 Mauritania 146 152 152 152 154 154 154
Peru 55 54 59 55 53 57 56 Botswana 147 84 80 84 84 79 83
United Arab Emirates 56 41 37 39 42 39 39 Benin 148 139 139 140 140 139 139
Morocco 57 57 56 57 54 55 55 Burkina Faso 149 133 130 131 130 128 129
Bangladesh 58 71 71 73 59 59 58 Chad 150 132 135 135 138 138 138
Congo, Dem. Republic of 58 63 123 69 63 112 69 Central African Republic 150 158 163 159 153 153 153
Zambia 60 122 127 126 125 129 127 Lao, People's Dem. Republ 152 146 150 148 143 151 146
Serbia / Montenegro 61 74 69 71 74 69 70 Mongolia 153 150 149 150 152 152 152
Sri Lanka 62 85 82 86 78 77 79 Swaziland 153 134 131 130 136 133 134
Belarus 63 81 75 77 79 74 75 Albania 155 117 113 114 120 117 118
Ghana 64 104 104 105 90 92 93 Lesotho 156 145 142 143 148 142 142
Kazakhstan 65 61 62 62 61 60 61 Equatorial Guinea 157 114 115 115 115 116 116
Croatia 66 62 64 63 62 64 64 Gambia, The 158 171 171 171 165 165 167
Slovak Republic 67 56 53 54 56 56 57 Belize 159 160 159 161 161 162 162
Zimbabwe 68 119 112 113 118 114 114 San Marino 160 140 137 138 150 150 151
Trinidad and Tobago 69 89 84 87 94 87 91 Vanuatu 160 172 172 172 174 172 174
Vietnam 70 59 60 60 55 54 54 Djibouti 162 169 168 169 170 168 171
Cote d'Ivoire 71 95 88 90 100 93 94 Eritrea 162 154 154 154 155 155 155
Sudan 72 102 97 101 89 86 90 St. Lucia 164 165 165 167 168 167 169
Uruguay 73 80 89 83 82 91 85 Guinea-Bissau 165 163 161 164 162 163 164
Ecuador 74 67 81 70 68 83 71 Antigua and Barbuda 165 167 156 156 169 160 160
Syrian Arab Republic 75 65 63 64 76 75 77 Grenada 167 170 170 170 172 171 172
Tunisia 76 75 73 75 70 71 72 Samoa 167 178 177 177 176 176 176
Angola 77 64 61 61 65 63 63 Solomon Islands 169 174 173 173 171 166 168
Luxembourg 78 42 42 43 44 42 44 Cape Verde 169 161 167 163 164 170 166
Uzbekistan 79 88 94 91 86 90 87 Comoros 171 179 178 179 179 177 178
Jamaica 80 94 103 96 103 110 105 St. Kitts and Nevis 171 176 174 175 177 175 175
Kenya 81 100 102 100 96 99 97 Seychelles 171 162 169 165 167 174 170
Qatar 82 70 68 68 72 70 73 St. Vincent and the Grenadi 174 173 176 174 175 179 177
Myanmar 83 108 108 109 88 85 88 Dominica 174 177 180 178 173 173 173
Yemen, Republic of 84 68 67 67 69 67 68 Maldives 174 164 158 162 166 164 165
Slovenia 85 66 65 65 67 65 65 Timor-Leste 174 157 155 155 160 159 159
Dominican Republic 86 86 83 85 83 81 82 Sao Tome and Principe 178 184 184 184 184 184 184
Brunei Darussalam 87 87 99 93 93 106 99 Tonga 178 181 181 181 180 180 180
Guatemala 88 79 78 80 81 80 81 Bhutan 180 159 157 158 157 156 156
Panama 89 91 98 94 99 107 103 Kiribati 180 166 162 166 163 161 163
Lebanon 90 58 57 58 58 58 59 Micronesia, Fed. States of 182 175 175 176 178 178 179
Tanzania 91 103 96 102 106 101 104 Marshall Islands 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
Oman 92 72 66 66 71 68 67 Palau, Republic of               184 182 182 182 182 182 182
Source: IMF Source: IMF  
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